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ABSTRACT
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter "GATT") and
the World Trade Organization (hereinafter "WTO") Anti-dumping Agreement
(hereinafter "ADA") permit WTO members to impose anti-dumping duties as a result
of an anti-dumping investigation if any member concludes that a certain product,
imported to its territory, has caused or threatens to cause a serious injury to its
domestic industry. Accordingly, this member may increase tariffs on this imported
product by a specific amount calculated through certain methodologies for each
foreign exporter/producer whose imports are subject to the concluded investigation.
However, Article VI of GATT and the ADA do not condemn dumping as price
discrimination but condemn the product dumping situations causing or threatening to
cause material injury to the domestic industry. Consequently, the dumping practice
itself is not the only reason for allowing any party to impose anti-dumping duties. The
most important factor in the anti-dumping investigation process is to provide clear
analysis that dumped imports have indeed caused or threaten to cause serious injury
to the domestic industry. Unfortunately, the ADA does not provide members with
clear provisions on how to reach this conclusion. In addition, and according to Article
11.1 of the ADA, the imposition of “anti-dumping duty shall remain in force only as
long as and to the extent necessary to counter dumping which is causing injury.” The
ADA provisions also do not provide clear and objective analysis guidelines to
determine whether a member should eliminate anti-dumping duties. The weaknesses
of this Agreement, which exist in significant and crucial provisions, such as those
relating to injury and causality determinations, or the review of the anti-dumping
duties with respect to their level and duration, encourage WTO members to abuse
these rules by overprotecting their domestic industries. The extensive use of this tool
destroys the main purpose of this Agreement, to stop or hinder injury that is caused
by dumped imports. These weaknesses, which undermine the objectivity of the antidumping investigations, distort international trade by imposing various anti-dumping
duties on numerous foreign products, which are not necessarily causing or threatening
to cause material injury.
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I. Introduction
The World Trade Organization (hereinafter "WTO") was established on 1 January
1995 as a result of a multinational agreement created by the Uruguay Round
Negotiations (1986-1994). The WTO "is the only global international organization
dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements,
negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their
parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and
importers conduct their business."1 At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
Negotiations, the Legal Text was concluded with the Marrakesh Agreement
establishing the WTO, and four different Annexes. This paper will focus primarily on
Annex 1A of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which is also known
as "GATT 1994" and contains its Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI or
the Anti-dumping Agreement (hereinafter "ADA")2.

The GATT/WTO system was mainly created to eliminate trade barriers including
tariff reductions. All WTO members provide tariff concessions to other WTO parties
by entering in various bilateral negotiations with one another. Consequently, and to
ensure that these tariff reductions would be applied without discrimination between
the parties, the Most Favored Nation Rule (hereinafter "MFN") was embedded in
Article I of GATT 1994. The purpose of this rule is to oblige the WTO member to
apply the same treatment to all other WTO members without discrimination.
However, the GATT Agreement permits any member to depart from this rule as a
result of an anti-dumping investigation and if the member concludes that a certain
1
2

http:/wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2008).
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs in and
Trade, the Legal Text, the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
147 (1994).
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product imported to its territory has caused or threatens to cause a serious injury to its
domestic industry. Accordingly, this member may increase tariffs on the imported
product in question by a specific amount calculated through certain methodologies for
each foreign exporter/producer.

In fact, anti-dumping rules were not originally introduced by the GATT/WTO
multilateral negotiations. These rules were previously enacted by some developed
countries, Canada in 1904, Australia in 1906, the US in 1916, and New Zealand and
the United Kingdom in 1921. All the aforementioned developed countries used antidumping rules to protect their domestic industries against imported products by
increasing their tariffs on foreign products. This inevitably led to an increase in the
prices of these very products relatively to their like domestic products. These
measures provide the domestic products with a competitive advantage over the
imported foreign products.

The fear of international trade liberalization and the consequences of tariff reductions
resulting from GATT/WTO agreements, led the WTO contracting parties to provide
legal tools within the GATT/WTO Agreement that restrict international trade in the
case where a specific product caused or threatened to cause damages in the domestic
industry of any member. These regulatory tools were provided under Article VI of
GATT 1994 and the WTO ADA. Although these rules do not condemn dumping as
price discrimination, they condemn the product dumping situations causing or
threatening to cause material injury to the domestic industry. Consequently, the
dumping practice itself is not the only reason that allows any party to impose antidumping duties. The most important factor in the anti-dumping investigation process

2

is to provide clear analysis that dumped imports have indeed caused or have
threatened to cause serious injury to the domestic industry.

Unfortunately, the ADA does not give members clear provisions for how to reach
these conclusions. In addition and according to Article 11.1 of the ADA, the
imposition of “anti-dumping duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the
extent necessary to counter dumping which is causing injury.” Moreover, ADA
provisions did not provide clear and objective analysis to determine whether a
member should eliminate anti-dumping duties. The weaknesses of this Agreement,
which exist in significant and crucial provisions such as those relating to injury and
causality determinations or the review of anti-dumping duties with respect to their
level and duration, encourage WTO members to exploit these rules by overprotecting
their domestic industries. The extensive use of anti-dumping measures undermines the
main purpose of this Agreement, which is primarily to stop or hinder injury that is
caused by dumped imports. These weaknesses, which undermine the objectivity of the
anti-dumping investigations, distort international trade as they impose various antidumping duties by WTO members on numerous foreign products which are not
necessarily causing or threatening to cause material injury.

This thesis is organized as follows: the introduction in chapter one leads to chapter
two which provides a simple explanation of the WTO anti-dumping rules and how the
anti-dumping investigation should be conducted pursuant to the ADA. Chapter three
then highlights the legal gaps in the WTO ADA, especially in relation to articles
dealing with injury and causality determinations and those dealing with the reviews of
anti-dumping duties. It also provides evidence of how the judicial review mechanism
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in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter "DSB") fails to effectively fill these
legal gaps. Panelists found their hands tied when it came to clarifying the deficiencies
of some anti-dumping provisions, due to the absence of clear textual provisions. Thus,
the panelists left the WTO members with wide discretionary powers that allowed
them to manipulate anti-dumping rules so as to impose disguised trade barriers on a
selective and discriminatory basis in the pursuit and preservation of their favorable
market interests. In addition, this chapter endeavors to highlight the efforts made by
various WTO members to clarify or amend this Agreement during the current WTO
negotiations by producing a newly proposed legal text of the ADA. It also analyzes
the new proposed text to see if the problems mentioned above will be solved by the
application of the amended ADA. Finally, Chapter four provides findings and
recommendations in order to ensure that the anti-dumping rules are applied in a
manner that best fulfills their purposes.
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II. Overview of the WTO Anti-Dumping Rules
In order to understand the legal gaps in the ADA and their effect on the international
market, it is necessary to first understand the current provisions of the ADA rules.
This chapter examines and sheds light on the main pillars of any anti-dumping
investigation process, which include the government of the WTO member or the
investigating authority (hereinafter "IA"), the domestic industry (hereinafter "DI"),
competing domestic and foreign products vis-à-vis "like product and product
concerned", and the determination of dumping, which caused or threatens to cause
injury to the domestic industry. Clarification of the definition of each pillar will
facilitate an understanding of the explanation of how the investigation actually runs.

A. Basic theme of anti-dumping investigations
1. Investigating Authority (IA)
The WTO Agreements have been formulated and signed by WTO members. Thus, the
language of the WTO Agreements targets in its provisions and obligations the
governments of its members. Anti-dumping provisions incorporated under Article VI:
1 of the GATT 1994 refers to these governments by using the term "the contracting
parties recognize that dumping…etc" (emphases added). In addition, Article VI: 2 of
the GATT 1994 states that "in order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party
may levy on any dumped product…etc" (emphases added). However, in the ADA,
these governments have been referred to as "authorities". Article 5.4 of the ADA
specifies that "an investigation shall not be initiated pursuant to paragraph 1 unless the
authorities have determined…etc" (emphases added). In sum, the element of a
governmental body is quite essential and serves as the bedrock for carrying out the
obligatory investigation process, since no anti-dumping measures may be applied
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unless an investigation has been carried out. Article 1 of the ADA states that "an
anti-dumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided for in
Article VI of the GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted
in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement." Accordingly, any WTO
member shall establish a competent governmental authority to conduct anti-dumping
investigations. The authority is obliged to conduct these investigations in an unbiased
manner and pursuant to the provisions in Article VI of the GATT and the ADA. In
addition, any conclusion made by these authorities may be reviewed by domestic courts
in an internal judicial review pursuant to the ADA Article 13 and by DSB pursuant to
the ADA Article 17.

2. Domestic Industry (DI)
The ADA defines DI in its Article 4.1 as follows: "for the purposes of this Agreement,
the term ‘domestic industry’ shall be interpreted as referring to the domestic
producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output
of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of
those products... etc." No anti-dumping investigation can be conducted unless the
WTO member demonstrates that its domestic market contains producer/s that produce
a like product. Article 5.4 of the ADA obliges the IA, in order to conduct an antidumping investigation, to determine that the complaint has been submitted by the
domestic producers of the like product. However, the ADA considers that it is enough
to initiate an anti-dumping investigation if it is supported by "those domestic
producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the total
production of the like product produced by that portion of the domestic industry
expressing either support for or opposition to the application. However, no
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investigation shall be initiated when domestic producers expressly supporting the
application account for less than 25 percent of total production of the like product
produced by the domestic industry."3 Pursuant to this article, the IA may initiate an
anti-dumping investigation with the support of the domestic producers of the like
product, which account for 25 per cent or more of the total production. And these
producers shall account 50 percent or more of the total production of those who
expressly oppose initiating the investigation. Yet, under special circumstances and
pursuant to Article 5.6 of the ADA, the IA can initiate an anti-dumping investigation
without necessarily having received an application from or on behalf of the domestic
industry and if it has sufficient evidence of dumping, injury, and a causal link. In this
case the IA is also required to conduct the injury analysis on the domestic industry
within the definition of Article 4.1 of the ADA.

3. Product concerned and like products
In principle, the underlying reason for the anti-dumping investigation is to examine
whether the imported dumped product has caused or threatens to cause injury to the
domestic industry. In this regard, three types of products are subject to the
investigation: first, the "domestic like product," which is the product produced and
sold in the domestic market of the importing member, second, the "foreign like
product," which is the product produced and sold in the domestic market of the
exporting member, and third, the "product concerned," which is the product imported
by the importing member from the exporting member. In order to initiate an antidumping investigation, the IA should determine the definition of the product under
investigation to set the scope of the investigation. Based on this definition, the

3

ADA Article 5.4.
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examination of the dumping and injury determination should show the likeness of the
"domestic like product," the "product concerned," and the "foreign like product."
However, in the case where there is an absence of the "foreign like product" or if its
sales quantities are insufficient, the IA can rely on other alternatives, which will be
discussed later. Article 2.6 of the ADA defines the "like product" as follows:
"throughout this Agreement the term "like product" ("produit similaire") shall be
interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product
under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which,
although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the
product under consideration." The ADA required that these products should be
identical or at least bear a close resemblance to the other like product. One of the most
important features relied upon to determine the close resemblance is the physical
characteristic of the product in question. 4 In addition, end use, channel of sale,
consumer perception, competition, the process of manufacturing, and the content of
the products are also features which may be used in the likeness test.

4. Dumping, injury and causal link
The presence of the previous pillars allows a WTO member to initiate an antidumping investigation if the member is provided with adequate and accurate
minimum information about the allegation of dumping, injury, and causal link. 5
However, the anti-dumping investigation should determine the existence of these
three main elements: dumping, injury or threat of injury, and causal link between
dumped imports and the injury or threat of injury to the DI by obtaining,
investigating, and verifying information from DI and the exporting companies. The
4

IVO VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANÇOIS BELLIS, ANTI-DUMPING AND OTHER TRADE PROTECTION
LAWS OF THE EC 157 (4th ed. 2004).
5
ADA Article 5.2.
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absence of any of these elements should lead the IA to conclude no measures shall be
taken against the imported products. These three elements will be discussed in detail
in sections B and C of this chapter.

B. Dumping determinations
1. The concept of dumping
Since the GATT/WTO system aims to create free international trade by eliminating or
reducing tariff and non-tariff restrictions and since all WTO members are required to
reduce their tariff duties, the need for anti-dumping rules became necessary. No WTO
member would agree to let its DI be harmed by allowing foreign imports to flood its
domestic market through artificially low prices without having legal actions to stop
this injury under the GATT/WTO system. The success in creating free markets should
be joined with reasonable rules to guarantee fair trade. 6 In order to create balance
between free and fair trade and to still relieve DIs' worries about the consequences of
tariff reductions, the GATT/WTO rules prohibit price discrimination between the
selling prices in the foreign and domestic markets if this discrimination causes or
threatens material injury to the DI of the importing members. The concept of dumping
is provided in the Article VI: 1 of the GATT as follows:
The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products of
one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at
less than the normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it
causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the
territory of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment
of a domestic industry. For the purposes of this Article, a product is to
be considered as being introduced into the commerce of an importing
country at less than its normal value, if the price of the product
exported from one country to another

6

CLIVE STANBROOK & PHILIP BENTLEY, DUMPING AND SUBSIDIES: THE LAW AND PROCEDURES
GOVERNING THE IMPOSITION OF ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1 (1996).
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(a)
(b)

is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course
of trade, for the like product when destined for
consumption in the exporting country, or,
in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either
(i)
the highest comparable price for the like product
for export to any third country in the ordinary
course of trade, or
(ii)
the cost of production of the product in the
country of origin plus a reasonable addition for
selling cost and profit.

The same provisions are in Article 2.1 and 2.2 of the ADA. In sum, these articles
condemn a particular dumping practice if it has negative effects on the status of the DI
of its importing WTO members. In the case where negative effects are indeed
prevalent, only the WTO member can raise its tariff duties against the dumped
imports to the extent necessary to counteract dumping, which is causing injurious
effects on the DI.

2. Normal value determinations
In principle, and pursuant to GATT 1994 and ADA, normal value refers to the price
of the foreign like product when it is destined for consumption in the
exporting/producing country and during the ordinary course of trade. 7 However, the
normal value is not as simple as it seems because there are many considerations that
should be taken by the IA in its determination of the normal value.

a. Situations of alternative normal values
The IA should disregard the actual normal value of the foreign like product pursuant
to Article 2.2 of the ADA, especially if one of the following three situations exists:

7

ADA Article 2.1.
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i. No sales in the ordinary course of trade
If the IA finds no sales of the product concerned in the domestic market of the
exporting/producing country or if there are sales, but not in the ordinary course of
trade, the IA should use alternative normal values. Unfortunately, the ADA did not
define the meaning of the "ordinary course of trade." However, ADA Article 2.2.1
provides an example of sales, which could be considered not in the ordinary course of
trade. This example refers to the sales made by the exporting/producing country "at
prices below per unit (fixed and variable) costs of production plus administrative,
selling and general costs." These sales could be disregarded in determining the normal
value "only if the authorities determine that such sales are made within an extended
period of time in substantial quantities and are at prices which do not provide for the
recovery of all costs within reasonable period of time, etc…" In addition, the
Appellate Body decision in US-Hot Rolled 8 discusses another type of sales out of the
ordinary course of trade, when the US considered the sales made by Japan in their
home market between two affiliated traders (parties linked by association or a
compensatory arrangement).

ii. Particular market situation
The ADA permits the IA to disregard the domestic sales of the exporting/producing
country because of the particular market situation. However, the ADA does not
provide a definition for this term nor does it provide any examples of this situation.
Furthermore, there is no case law in the WTO/Dispute Settlement defining this term.
Some legislation such as the EC AD Regulation, 9 defines the particular market

8

United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan,
WT/DS184/AB/R (2001).
9
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 384/96.
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situation when "such sales do not permit a proper comparison."10 One example of this
approach as applied by the EC is that the "domestic sales which were made through
sales channels different from those used on the Community market were also
considered as not permitting a proper comparison."11 In any event, the definition and
the application of the particular market situation has not yet been examined by the
WTO/Dispute Settlement. Hence, WTO members will take different approaches in
dealing with this situation.

iii. Low volume of sales in the domestic market of the exporting/producing country
The ADA permits the IA to disregard the domestic sales of the exporting/producing
country in the calculation of the normal value if these domestic sales have been made
in quantities below five percent of the quantities of the export sales to the imported
country. Accordingly, if the domestic sales of the like foreign product in the
exporting/producing country are 100 units and its exports of the product concerned to
the importing country are 1500 units, the IA will disregard the domestic sales of the
exporting/producing country and will use alternative normal values.

b. Types of alternative normal values
If one of the above mentioned situations exists, the IA should rely on a different
methodology to determine the normal value to be used in the determination of the
dumping margin because the existence of these situations does not permit proper
comparison between the normal value and the export price. Article 2.2 of the ADA
provides two methodologies for determining alternative normal values: either to rely
on "a comparable price of the like product when exported to an appropriate third
10
11

Id. at Article 2.3.
BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 4, at 64.
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country, provided that this price is representative, or on the cost of production in the
country of origin plus a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general
costs and profits."

i. Export sales to third countries
Instead of using the actual domestic prices of the exporting/producing country to
determine the normal value of the product concerned, the IA will use prices of the
exported like products to the third country. In order to do this, the IA should rely on
export sales to an appropriate third country. The criterion for defining "an appropriate
third country" has not been clearly provided in the existing legal text. In addition, this
method is rarely used by authorities; hence, it has not been discussed clearly in any
panel or appellate body reports. However, in applying this method, "all considerations
as to comparability and sales in the ordinary course of trade apply in the same way as
they apply to domestic sales of the exporting/producing country. The sales taken into
account must be representative."12

ii. Constructed normal value
This is the common method that is used by IAs because it guarantees accurate and
trustworthy normal values that represent the prices of goods actually exported to the
domestic market. On the contrary, prices of goods sold to third countries are rarely
used because of the suspicion that they could also be dumped prices. Constructing the
normal value is a very complicated process that needs much detailed data from the
producers to present their cost of production plus their amount for administrative,
selling, and general costs, as well as profits. The concept of this process is to build the

12

STANBROOK & BENTLEY, supra note 6, at 39.
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price of the product concerned when it destines for consumption in the
exporting/producing country.

c. Normal value of exports from non-market economy countries
The GATT Ad Article VI:2 provides the following: "it is recognized that, in the case
of imports from a country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly
of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State, special difficulties
may exist in determining price comparability for the purposes of paragraph 1, and in
such cases importing contracting parties may find it necessary to take into account the
possibility that a strict comparison with domestic prices in such a country may not
always be appropriate." This article exempts the WTO members from following the
provisions for determining the normal value of the product concerned if the export
sales are from a non-market economy country. Hence, the methodology used to
determine the normal value provided under ADA Article 2.2 is not strictly applied.
The reason behind this is that the prices and the costs of the product concerned are not
reliable information for determining the normal value because these prices and costs
are not set pursuant to the condition of the market economy and do not represent the
actual prices and cost in a free market. Accordingly in this case the IA may rely, in its
determination of the normal value, upon the information of the like product in the
third country and its applicability of the market economy's operative conditions.

14

3. Export price determinations
Export price is the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold
for export from the producing/exporting country. Normally, this price determination
relies upon the invoice prices of the product concerned and its terms of delivery.
These prices can include different costs such as cost, insurance, and freight
(hereinafter "CIF"), cost and freight (hereinafter "C&F"), or only cost without
insurance or freight (hereinafter "FOB"). In all cases, the IA normally sets the export
price on the CIF value because this value is needed for determining the margin of
dumping. However, in some cases the export price obtained from the invoices can be
unreliable because of the affiliation between the exporter/producer and the importer or
third party. In this case, ADA Article 2.3 allows the IA to construct the export price
based on the prices for which the imported products are first resold to an independent
buyer. If the IA finds no resale to an independent buyer or the products have been
resold under a different condition than when imported, it may determine the export
price upon any other methods that it deems reasonable.

4. Fair comparison and dumping margin
In order to determine the dumping margin, a fair comparison must be conducted
between the normal value and export price. The IA must set export price and normal
value at the same level of trade. Normally, most of the IAs set the two prices at the
ex-factory level of trade which means the price of the good at the factory door. The
IA is entitled to reach this level by adjusting any differences that might affect price
comparability between the two prices in order to set them at the same level of trade.
For example, differences can be found in physical characteristics, import charges and
taxation, and terms of sale. In addition, the IA must compare the two prices with
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respect to sales made at, as closely as possible, the same time. 13 After setting the
export price and normal value at the same level of trade, adjusting any differences that
might hinder price comparability, and after deducting the normal value from the
export price, the result is the dumping margin amount in absolute terms. However, in
order to determine the dumping margin’s percentage, the dumping amount must be
divided by the CIF value of the export price then multiplied by a hundred. This
formula will generate the dumping margin percentage that will be multiplied by the
CIF value of the product concerned if it is imported after the imposition of an
affirmative dumping margin and as a result of the anti-dumping investigation.

C. Injury determinations
1. The concept of injury
ADA footnote 9 defines injury as follows:
Under this Agreement the term 'injury' shall, unless otherwise
specified, be taken to mean material injury to a domestic industry,
threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation
of the establishment of such an industry and shall be interpreted in
accordance with the provisions of this Article.
However and as specified in the ADA, injury determination methods differ from one
type to another. For example, in its determination of material injury, the IA must
consider specific factors that are different from those considered in determining the
threat of material injury or material retardations. In any event, the main point of this
analysis is to provide the impact of the dumped imports on the status of the DI.
Injury determination is the foundation for the determination of the illegality of a
dumping practice under the provisions of the ADA. Mere dumping without causing
injury to the DI is a legitimate practice in itself and does not trigger nor allow a WTO
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member to apply anti-dumping measures on the dumped imports. Determining that
the DI suffers injury is not enough in itself as the importing member must determine
the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury. In order to reach injury
determination, a WTO member must analyze many aspects and factors provided
under ADA Article 3, which will be discussed below. In order to impose any antidumping measures, the WTO member must conclude that its DI suffers or is
threatened with injury as a result of the dumped imports.

2. Cumulation
According to ADA standards, anti-dumping measures may be applied on imports of
the like products produced or exported from a given country if after demonstrating,
through an investigation process, that the imports of this country are dumped imports
that have caused or threatened to cause material injury to the DI of the importing
WTO member. In some cases the dumped imports do not come from one country but
from more than one country. In these cases the importing country would be required
to determine a specific injury caused by each of the imports received from each
country. This separate determination is very difficult or nearly impossible as the
exporting country should demonstrate that there is injury caused by each country at a
time during which imports from different sources are simultaneously entering the
domestic market. However, ADA Article 3.3 permits the exporting member to
cumulatively assess the effect of all imports from different sources under certain
conditions, as provided below:
Where imports of a product from more than one country are
simultaneously subject to anti-dumping investigations, the
investigating authorities may cumulatively assess the effects of such
imports only if they determine that (a) the margin of dumping
established in relation to the imports from each country is more than
de minimis as defined in paragraph 8 of Article 5 and the volume of
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imports from each country is not negligible and (b) a cumulative
assessment of the effects of the imports is appropriate in light of the
conditions of competition between the imported products and the
conditions of competition between the imported products and the like
domestic product.
Unless the IA fulfilled its investigation obligations and meets the two conditions
through which it can assess the injury cumulatively, it should determine the injury
separately for each importing country.

3. The analysis of the volume of the dumped imports
The volume of dumped imports should be examined throughout the investigation
period (IP) to demonstrate caused injury. The assumption is that the dumped imports
increased during this period of time, thus, the DI suffers material injury. The IA must
compare the trend of dumped imports during the IP, which normally constitutes 3 or 4
years before the initiation of the investigation. This comparison is normally
considered on a quarterly basis for each year of the IP and on a yearly basis for all
years of the IP. Pursuant to ADA Article 3.2 "the IA shall consider whether there has
been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to
production or consumption in the importing member." Accordingly, the IA can
consider the increase in imports not only in absolute terms but also relative to the total
production or consumption of the domestic market of the importing country. Thus, if
the dumped imports are not increasing but decreasing, they can be considered
injurious within the meaning of this article, especially if they still constitute more than
the total production and consumption within each comparing periods. However, a
mere finding that dumped imports have increased does not necessarily justify injury
determination. The ADA does not consider specific indication as a proof of injury but
the IA should go through all related factors and examinations provided in ADA
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Article 3 in order to reach the answer on whether the DI suffers or is threatened to
suffer material injury.

4. The effect of dumped imports on domestic prices
Another indication of injury is the effect of the dumped imports on the DI's prices.
The rationale behind this indication is on the assumption that the dumped imports,
which normally enter with low prices to gain market share have an adverse effect on
the prices of the domestic like product. ADA Article 3.2 outlines the following:
[T]he investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a
significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared
with the price of a like product of the importing Member, or whether
the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant
degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have
occurred, to a significant degree.
Price undercutting, price depression, and price suppression are three tests that must be
considered by the IA to demonstrate the impact of the like product on the DI's prices.
However, the results of one or all of these tests are not by themselves exclusively
indicative of injury. These tests with other examinations can lead the IA to conclude
that the DI has suffered or is threatened to suffer injury. Through these tests the IA
must provide a comparison between the price trends during the IP. The comparison in
price undercutting must show whether the price of the product concerned is less than
that of the domestic like product during the IA. However, if the price of the product
concerned is more than the domestic like product, the IA can examine whether the
dumped imports had, or threatened to, decrease or restrain the domestic like product’s
price increase.
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5. The economic impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry
In addition to examining the effect of the dumped imports on the DI’s prices, the IA
has to examine the DI’s economic status by evaluating all of the relevant economic
factors before and after the entry of the dumped imports. Normally, the IA requests all
relevant data from the DI within the previous four or five years in order to conduct
this examination. ADA Article 3.4 refers to fifteen specific economic factors that
must be examined by the IA as a minimum. These factors have been identified as
follows:
The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic
industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant
economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the
industry, including actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output,
market share, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of
capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the
margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow,
inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or
investments. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these
factors necessarily give decisive guidance.
Pursuant to this article and as interpreted by WTO case law, the IA is required to
examine all of the aforementioned factors; disregarding any of these factors would be
a violation of ADA Article 3.4. In fact, the IA is not required to show that all of the
DI’s economic factors are affected by the dumped imports. It is only required to
examine the condition of these factors after the introduction of the dumped imports
and then evaluate the effect of the dumped imports on the DI’s economic status as a
whole.

6. Causation and other known factors
If the IA concludes that the DI’s economic status has been negatively affected, it must
demonstrate that this negative impact has been indeed triggered by the dumped
imports. Accordingly, it is not enough for the IA to reach this conclusion by simply

20

showing that the negative impact started after the introduction of the dumped imports
for it should demonstrate that there are direct links between the introduction of the
dumped imports and the negative impact on the DI’s economic status. In order to
guarantee the neutrality of the attribution of the DI’s negative impact, ADA Article
3.5 obliges the IA to examine any other factors that could be reasons for the DI’s
negative economic impact. ADA Article 3.5 provides examples of those additional
factors, other than the dumped imports, that could have an effect on the DI’s
economic status as follows:
It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the
effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury
within the meaning of this Agreement. The demonstration of a causal
relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the
domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant
evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any
known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time
are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these
other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. Factors
which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume
and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices, contraction in
demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive
practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic
producers, developments in technology and the export performance
and productivity of the domestic industry.
This provision does not assume that the existence of other factors affecting the DI
necessarily dismisses the possibility of dumped imports being injurious. It only
obliges the IA to examine all factors in its investigation process that negatively affect
the DI. Accordingly, if the IA finds other factors of injury besides dumped imports, it
can conclude that the dumped imports are not the only cause but just one of the
factors of injury.
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7. Threat of material injury
Pursuant to the injury concept described above, injury can be material injury or a
threat of material injury to a DI. The IA may, in some cases, conclude that there is no
material injury but there is a prevailing threat of material injury that can be caused by
the dumped imports. The demonstration of the threat of material injury must be based
on sufficient evidence and not mere allegations. The conclusion of threat of material
injury is enough to justify the imposition of dumping measures pursuant to ADA.
Hence, ADA Article 3.7 provides the IA with specific examination guidelines to
conclude the threat of material injury. These guidelines are as follows:
A determination of a threat of material injury shall be based on facts
and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility. The
change in circumstances which would create a situation in which the
dumping would cause injury must be clearly foreseen and imminent.
In making a determination regarding the existence of a threat of
material injury, the authorities should consider, inter alia, such factors
as:
(i)
a significant rate of increase of dumped imports into the
domestic market indicating the likelihood of substantially
increased importation;
(ii)
sufficient freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial
increase in, capacity of the exporter indicating the likelihood of
substantially increased dumped exports to the importing
Member's market, taking into account the availability of other
export markets to absorb any additional exports;
(iii)
whether imports are entering at prices that will have a
significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic
prices, and would likely increase demand for further imports;
and
(iv)
inventories of the product being investigated.
No one of these factors by itself can necessarily give decisive
guidance, but the totality of the factors considered must lead to the
conclusion that further dumped exports are imminent and that, unless
protective action is taken, material injury would occur.
This provision requires the IA to demonstrate that there is a significant rate of
increase in dumped imports, which will further increase and hinder the economic
well-being of the DI if no measures are applied.

22

D. Reviews
1. Interim or changed circumstances reviews
Interim reviews are the mechanism granted under the ADA for review of any new
circumstances occurring with regards to the anti-dumping measures during their
imposition. As a result of the anti-dumping investigation, if the IA concludes that
there is dumping, injury, and a causal link, it can impose anti-dumping duties or
undertakings. In principle, the amount of anti-dumping duties must not exceed the
margin of dumping established during the investigation. Indeed, if any interested
party believes that the duties collected exceed the margin of dumping, a refund review
can be requested in order to refund all the exceeded amount of money to the
concerned party.14 In addition, another type of review can be requested by any new
exporter/producer that starts shipping the like product after the end or nearly the end
of the anti-dumping investigation. This exporter/producer can request a new shipper
review from the IA, which will determine for the individual margin of dumping on a
case-by-case basis. 15 Moreover, a third type of interim review is the review of the
need to continue imposing the duty to offset dumping, or injury or both, and whether
the injury or dumping or both would be likely to continue or recur if the duty is
removed.16

This type of review can be requested by any interested party after a reasonable period
of time has elapsed from the duty imposition or the IA can conduct this review at any
time after the imposition of the duties. In fact, these three types of reviews are the
most widely used by WTO members as they apply anti-dumping duties. However,
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ADA Article 9.3.
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16
ADA Article 11.2.
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23

there can be other types of reviews, such as determining the scope of the like product,
depending on different cases. In general, any new circumstances affecting the finding
of facts or law of the original investigation should be handled through a review by the
IA on its initiative, or by a request of any interested party, in order to give all
interested parties an adequate opportunity to participate in any new decision which
may be taken.

2. Five years ("Sunset" or "Expiry") reviews
Anti-dumping measures must not remain in force more than five years to the day of
their imposition. The WTO member can impose anti-dumping measures to the extent
necessary to counteract dumping that causes injury without exceeding five years.
However, ADA Article 11.3 permits WTO members to renew the time period for an
additional five years if the member conducts, upon its initiative or by request from the
DI, a sunset review to determine whether the revocation of the anti-dumping measures
would be likely to lead to the continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. 17 If
the IA does not receive a request from the DI, or self initiates this review before the
end of the five years of the anti-dumping measures, it must revoke the measures after
the five years elapse. The IA in this review shall consider the likelihood of
continuation or recurrence of both dumping and injury. Thus, considering only the
likelihood of dumping does not permit the IA to renew the five year period of antidumping duties even if it concludes that the dumping would continue or recur.

17

ADA Article 11.3.
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III. Deficiencies in the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement
An overview of the WTO anti-dumping rules is essential as a first step to introduce
the discussion of how the ambiguity of the legal text of the ADA negatively affects
international trade. Although WTO Agreements are established to liberalize
international trade by eliminating tariff and non-tariff restrictions, the ambiguity of
the ADA encourages WTO members to use its rules as a means to restrict
importations of foreign goods. Consequently, and after the WTO Agreements have
come into force, 3210 anti-dumping investigations have been initiated and 2049
definitive anti-dumping measures have been applied by the WTO members from 1995
to 2007. These initiations and definitive measures included goods linked to 19
different sectors in the harmonized tariff system. These numbers indicate how many
restrictions and distortions were caused by the arbitrary application of this
Agreement.18

This chapter primarily focuses on the deficiencies of injury and Sunset Review
provisions under the ADA. Injury analysis is the core point of the dumping accusation
since dumping without causing injury is not considered an issue within the ADA. And
the current terms of the Sunset Review provide a continuing guarantee for the renewal
of the anti-dumping measures to protect certain industries for an unlimited time. Thus,
this chapter shows how easily a WTO member may to conduct an anti-dumping
investigation to find an injury or conduct a Sunset Review to find likelihood of
recurrence or continuation of dumping and injury. As Tharakan indicates, "a number
of studies have indicated that the injury determination process is the component of
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http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2008).
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contingent protection that is the most amenable to misuse." 19 Therefore, this chapter
will examine the wide discretionary powers that the WTO leaves to its members to
allow them to manipulate the anti-dumping rules by protecting their DI and imposing
disguised trade barriers.

A. Injury determinations
1. Legal critique of the current cumulation provisions
The discussion of cumulation in Chapter II illustrates how the ADA provisions permit
WTO members to cumulatively assess the effect of all imports from different sources,
under certain conditions, as provided under ADA Article 3.3. Current cumulation
provisions may attribute injury to small quantities of dumped imports that do not have
injurious effect on the DI because these imports have been cumulatively assessed with
other high or increasing volumes of dumped imports from other countries.

a. Legal arguments against current provisions of cumulation and interpretations of the
WTO case law
In order to demonstrate material injury considerations must include of, first, "whether
there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or
relative to production or consumption in the importing Member"20 and the effect of
dumped imports on domestic prices, and second, the impact of these imports on
domestic producers.21 In brief, the IA should examine the volume of the imports and
their effect on prices and the consequent effects on the domestic producers. However,
the current cumulation provision in the ADA permits the WTO members, in case of
19

P. K. M. Tharakan, Political Economy and Contingent Protection, 105 Econ.J. 1550, 1562
(1995).
20
ADA Article 3.2.
21
ADA Article 3.1.
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more than one country exporting the like product at the same time, to cumulatively
examine the effect of these imports on the DI. Using cumulation may allow a WTO
member to sanction one country by anti-dumping measures even if the import’s
volume of the exporting country did not increase in absolute or relative terms and its
prices have no effect on the domestic prices. Indeed, the current language of
cumulation creates an unfair position for the described exporting country because its
imports are assessed with other harmful imports that are causing injury.

An illustration of this is found in EC-Pipe Fittings when Brazil argued the following:
[T]he volume and price analyses prescribed by Article 3.2 must first be
performed on a country-by-country basis as a pre-condition to
cumulative assessment under Article 3.3. According to Brazil, only if
such a country-specific analysis has identified the imports of the
particular country as a likely source of negative effects on the
domestic industry, is it permissible under Article 3.3 for an
investigating authority to cumulatively assess the negative effects of
all imports likely to have caused injury.22
However, the Appellate Body rejected the Brazilian interpretation and went through
textual analysis of the relevant articles and asserted that:
The text of Article 3.3 expressly identifies three conditions that must
be satisfied before an investigating authority is permitted under the
Anti-Dumping Agreement to assess cumulatively the effects of
imports from several countries. These conditions are:
(a) the dumping margin from each individual country must be more
than de minimis;
(b) the volume of imports from each individual country must not be
negligible; and
(c) cumulation must be appropriate in the light of the conditions of
competition
(i) between the imported products; and
(ii) between the imported products and the like domestic
product.
By the terms of Article 3.3, it is 'only if' the above conditions are
established that an investigating authority 'may' make a cumulative
assessment of the effects of dumped imports from several countries.
22

European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe
Fittings from Brazil, para. 105, WT/DS219/AB/R (2003).
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We find no basis in the text of Article 3.3 for Brazil's assertion that a
country-specific analysis of the potential negative effects of volumes
and prices of dumped imports is a pre-condition for a cumulative
assessment of the effects of all dumped imports. Article 3.3 sets out
expressly the conditions that must be fulfilled before the investigating
authorities may cumulatively assess the effects of dumped imports
from more than one country. There is no reference to the country-bycountry volume and price analyses that Brazil contends are preconditions to cumulation. In fact, Article 3.3 expressly requires an
investigating authority to examine country-specific volumes, not in the
manner suggested by Brazil, but for purposes of determining whether
the 'volume of imports from each country is not negligible.'23
Accordingly, the Appellate Body did not find any supporting evidence in the legal
text of ADA to hold that the importing country must first individually assess the effect
of the dumped imports from each exporting countries. In addition, the Appellate Body
justified its interpretation as being consistent with the rationale behind the practice of
cumulation. In its point of view, the cumulation provision would be undermined if it
ruled according to Brazilian interpretation since it is practically difficult to
differentiate between the injurious effects of different dumped imports from several
sources. Assessing the volume and price effect on a country-by-country basis may
indeed attribute injury to large volumes of dumped imports, but also may not attribute
injury to low volumes of imports from different sources if they are individually
assessed. Although the Appellate Body's interpretation of cumulation was restricted
with the language of the current legal text, this interpretation may lead to the
application of anti-dumping measures on countries which may not in fact be causing
injury if their imports were assessed individually. It is clear that the Appellate Body’s
interpretation is cautious in its approach to the injured importing country regardless of
the interest of the exporting countries whose imports may individually not be causing
injury.

23

Id. at paras. 109-110.
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In fact, the Appellate Body's position would be justified if the individual assessment
of dumped imports shows that all or most importing countries have low import
volumes while in fact these low volumes cumulatively are increased in absolute or
relative terms. However, this position would not be justified if one importing country
has a significantly increased volume of dumped imports while another country with
low or decreasing import volumes is sanctioned only because its imports were
evaluated cumulatively with those of the first country.

The WTO members recognized this situation when they provided in the current text
of ADA Article 3.3 that the imports of each importing country should not be
negligible. However, the negligibility is not defined under Article 3.3 of the ADA.
Some practitioners believe that negligibility is defined under ADA Article 5.8 as
constituting less than 3 per cent of imports of the like product in the importing
country: other practitioners oppose this point of view and believe that ADA Article
3.3 is drafted in an ambiguous way which may suggest different interpretations
especially due to absence of cross reference to Article 5.8 directly after the
negligibility condition. The opposing practitioners demonstrate their objection on the
ground that ADA Article 3.3 is drafted in a relevant part as follows:
[T]he investigating authorities may cumulatively assess the effects of
such imports only if they determine that (a) the margin of dumping
established in relation to the imports from each country is more than
de minimis as defined in paragraph 8 of Article 5 and the volume of
imports from each country is not negligible. (emphasis added)
The drafters mention the cross reference of "paragraph 8 of Article 5" to define the
term "de minimis" and do not mention it again after the term "negligible." This
discrepancy has not been settled yet because the issue has not been referred to the
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WTO through any cases. In any event, and if it is true that the drafters mean that the
import volume of each country should be 3 per cent or more to be assessed
cumulatively, this threshold still very low and should be increased because a member
who imports 3 per cent of the total imports should not be treated on the same level as
another whose imports may constitute 20 or 40 per cent of the total imports. Indeed,
the member whose dumped import’s volume is higher is causing relatively more
injury. Thus, the current cumulation provision should be amended or clarified to avoid
this unjust assessment. This can be fulfilled by raising the negligible threshold and
setting a mechanism to differentiate between the anti-dumping measures, which may
be imposed, pursuant to the level of the dumped imports for each exporting country.

b. Evaluation of the proposed new legal text of the ADA by the WTO members
Within the framework of the WTO discussions, which trigger efforts concerning the
enhancement and clarification of WTO Agreements and draw lines for additional
Multilateral Agreements concerning new international topics, "WTO members agreed
at the Doha Ministerial Conference to launch negotiations in the area of ‘WTO
Rules.’ These negotiations relate to the following: the Agreement on Implementation
of Article VI of GATT 1994 (better known as the ADA), the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures and, in this context, WTO disciplines on fisheries
subsidies; and WTO provisions applying to regional trade agreements."24 As a result
of this ongoing negotiation the Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Rules
circulated, on 30 November 2007, to the WTO members his Draft Consolidated Texts
on the ADA.25 The Chairman encouraged the WTO members to reach a mutual
24
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http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/rulesneg_e.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2008).
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Dec. 2, 2008). See also Negotiating Group on Rules, WTO, TN/RL/W/232 (2008).
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agreement on the proposed amendments after he believed that the ongoing
negotiations took more time than expected. After considering most of the members’
concerns he proposed the consolidated version to be discussed by the various
delegations. This section presents the proposed amendments and the extent to which
they will clarify or eliminate legal deficiencies in relation to the ADA.

Concerning cumulation methodology, as provided under the ADA Article 3.3, the
Draft Consolidated Texts show proposed amendments by WTO members to clarify
the de minimis and negligible definitions. The proposed clarification adds a clear
cross-reference to ADA Article 5.8 by requiring the exclusion of any dumped imports
from the cumulation assessment if they are less than 3 per cent of the total imports of
the product concerned. ADA Article 5.8 states in relevant part as follows:
There shall be immediate termination in cases where the authorities
determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis, or that the
volume of dumped imports, actual or potential, or the injury, is
negligible. The margin of dumping shall be considered to be
de minimis if this margin is less than 2 per cent, expressed as a
percentage of the export price. The volume of dumped imports shall
normally be regarded as negligible if the volume of dumped imports
from a particular country is found to account for less than 3 per cent of
imports of the like product in the importing Member, unless countries
which individually account for less than 3 per cent of the imports of
the like product in the importing Member collectively account for
more than 7 per cent of imports of the like product in the importing
Member.
Adding Article 5.8 as a cross-reference in Article 3.3 would mean that the IA should
exclude from its cumulation assessments all imports from countries that constitute
less than 3 per cent of the total imports of the product concerned. However, it also
means that countries which constitute less than 3 per cent can be cumulated if the
imports of these countries collectively account for more than 7 per cent of the total
imports of the product concerned. In fact, this proposal would put countries with low
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volumes in a worse position than has been discussed above since countries that import
volumes less than 3 per cent may also be included in the cumulative assessment.

Other amendments have been suggested which would increase the threshold
requirements in Article 5.8 by increasing the negligibility amount to reach 10 per cent
and to delete the possibility of including the countries that account for 3 per cent if
they account collectively for 7 per cent of the total imports of the product concerned.
If these two proposals are simultaneously applied, the risk of including the countries
with low volume imports in the cumulative assessment will be reduced.

2. Legal critique of the current provisions of the effect of dumped imports on
domestic prices
The effect of the dumped imports on the DI is an essential element in determining the
occurred injury to the DI. After determining the absolute or relative increase of the
dumped imports, the IA shall examine the effect of these imports on the DI's prices by
considering whether there has been a significant price undercutting, price depression,
or price suppression.26 In fact, Article 3.2 of the ADA does not require any specific
outcomes. It only requires the IA to examine the effect of the dumped imports on the
DI's prices. In addition, this article does not include a specific threshold of that effect,
which might justify or support the conclusion of a negative outcome occurring
through these examinations.

26

ADA Article 3.2.
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a. Legal arguments against current provisions of the effect of dumped imports on
domestic prices and interpretations of WTO case law
An examination of the effect of dumped imports on the DI must include an
examination of prices of the like product and whether DI suffers from the prices of
dumped imports. In this examination process, the IA is obliged to examine the effect
of the dumped imports’ prices on the DI’s prices pursuant to ADA Article 3.2, which
relevantly states:
With regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices, the
investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a
significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared
with the price of a like product of the importing Member, or whether
the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant
degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have
occurred, to a significant degree. No one or several of these factors can
necessarily give decisive guidance.
Hence, the legal text of this article obliges the IA to "consider" three types of price
effects: price undercutting, price depression, and price suppression. However, the
term "consider" does not introduce specific action to be taken by the IA so as to
"determine" or to "find" one of these price effects. Furthermore, although the text
identifies that the considered price effects must be significant, the closing statement of
the article indicates that "no one or several of these factors can necessarily give
decisive guidance."27 In brief, the IA is only obliged to "consider" and not to "find"
any one of these factors in order to fulfill the requirement of the mentioned part of
article 3.2.
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Three panel reports discussed the price effects as mentioned in ADA Article 3.2: EC
–Salmon28, Korea- Paper29, and Egypt- Rebar30. In EC–Salmon, the Panel discussed
the issue of the difference between "consider" and "find" as follows:
It is clear that the text of Article 3.2 provides no methodological
guidance as to how an investigating authority is to 'consider' whether
there has been significant price undercutting. It is also clear that while
the question of significant price undercutting must be considered, a
finding of significant price undercutting is not necessary to a finding
that dumped imports have had an effect on prices. In our view, price
undercutting may be demonstrated by comparing the prices of the like
product of the domestic industry with the prices of the dumped
imports, as the EC did in this case. Where the prices of imports are
lower than the domestic prices, it seems clear to us that there is, as a
factual matter, price undercutting. The significance of any such
undercutting would, in our view, be a question of the magnitude of
such price difference, in light of other relevant information concerning
competition in the domestic market between the imports and the
domestic product, the nature of the product, and other factors. It is in
this context that the question of a price premium may be relevant.31
According to the Panel's interpretation, the IA is not obliged to demonstrate that the
dumped imports have had an effect on domestic prices to fulfill the requirement of
ADA Article 3.2. It is enough for IA to conduct the mentioned examinations of price
effect without necessarily concluding the existence of a price effect.

In Korea-Paper the Panel analyzed the term "significant" as it appears in ADA
Article 3.2 as follows:
We do not read Article 3.2 as requiring that the word 'significant'
appear in the text of the IA's determination. Furthermore, as we stated
above (para. 7.242),Article 3.2 does not generally require the IA to
make a determination about the 'significance' of price effects or indeed
as to whether there were price effects as such. All it requires is that the
28
29
30
31

European Communities - Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway,
WT/DS337/R (2008).
Korea - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from Indonesia, WT/DS312/R
(2005).
Egypt - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey, WT/DS211/R
(2002).
EC–Salmon, supra note 28, at para. 7.638.
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IA consider whether there has been significant price undercutting,
price depression or price suppression. In our view, therefore, the
requirements of that article will be satisfied if the determination
demonstrates that the IA properly considered whether or not prices of
dumped imports had one of the three price effects set out under Article
3.2.32
The Panel clarified that ADA Article 3.2 requires the IA to only consider whether the
dumped imports had one of the mentioned three price effects. As in EC –Salmon, this
Panel concluded that the IA is not obliged to make any determinations concerning
price effects analysis or its significance, it is only required to consider the existence
of one of these effects.

Requiring the IA to only consider price effects would weaken the objectivity of the
injury determination. Since one of the main effects responsible for the causation of
injury to the DI is the effect of the dumped imports on domestic prices, the absence of
requirements for producing specific findings in the examination of price effects
provides WTO members with an arbitrary authority for determining injury or threat
of injury. Finding one of these price effects in a case does not necessarily prove the
existence of injury or threat of injury since injury determination is based on a
cumulative assessment of all injury factors. However, the drafters of this article
should require a minimum threshold which would indicate that the DI's prices are
negatively effected. For example, in the case of price undercutting that occurs if the
price of the product concerned is lower than the price of the like product, the ADA
did not specify to what extent the differences between the two prices would be
sufficient in considering or proving serious price undercutting. Is it enough if the
price of the product concerned is lower than the like product's prices by 1%, 3%, or
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5%? The current draft of Article 3.2 may lead the IA to conclude injury regardless of
the seriousness of the negative effect of the dumped imports on the DI's prices.

b. Evaluation of the proposed new legal text of the ADA by the WTO members
No proposals or suggestions have been provided by the WTO members within the
framework of the WTO negotiations to amend ADA Article 3.2. However, some
proposals address the issue of calculating the injury margin, also known as "lesser
duty rule."33 This rule suggests that the IA shall, in addition to calculating the
dumping margin, calculate the injury margin and to apply the lesser margin when
determining the dumping measures. The injury margin calculation is based mainly on
the existing price undercutting. Thus, in case of determining the anti-dumping
measures based on injury margins, these measures would vary depending on the
differences between the prices of the product concerned and the like product. This
way of determination may produce fairer results if the injury margin is used to
calculate the definitive measures since the dumped imports with high export prices
would be subject to measures lesser than dumped imports with low export prices.

Another proposal34 suggests that in the case of no price undercutting, the IA should
conclude the absence of the causal link between the dumped imports and injury.
According to this proposal, the absence of price undercutting means that there is no
negative effect from the dumped imports on the DI's prices; thus, there is no causal
link between the dumped imports and the injury. However, if any injury is found, it
shall be attributed to factors other than the dumped imports.

33
34

Negotiating Group on Rules, WTO, TN/RL/GEN/43 (2005).
Id. at TN/RL/GEN/42 (2005).

36

Although these proposals do not tackle ADA Article 3.2 directly, they indirectly
highlight the need for the use of price effect data in a more serious manner. It is not
only sufficient to "consider" price effects without assessing the consequence of such
serious assessment. The outcome of this assessment makes a vital difference in the
final conclusion of the injury determination depending on the different results found.
This outcome can be quite effective, as provided in the mentioned proposals, in
reducing the applied duty in the case of using the lesser duty rule or in eliminating the
causal link between injury and dumped imports.

3. Legal critique of the current provisions of the causal link
The ADA Article 3.5 requires the IA to demonstrate a causal link between dumped
imports and the injury or threat of injury occurring to the DI. It is not enough to
merely demonstrate the existence of negative impacts on the DI after the flows of
dumped imports; the IA should examine all relevant evidence and any other factors
aside from dumped imports, which are injurious to the DI. 35 Although Article 3.5
provides a basic standard of evaluating the existence of factors of injury other than the
dumped imports, it fails to identify the method of the attribution. It becomes easy to
attribute injury to dumped imports since the IA is only required to examine other
possible factors of injury without clearly isolating the injury incurred due to dumped
imports and injury incurred due to other factors. This article did not provide guidance
on how to differentiate between injuries caused by the dumped imports and injuries
caused by other factors so as not to attribute the injuries caused by the latter to the
dumped imports. Without requiring the measurement of how much injury is caused by
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each type of factors, the attribution requirement provided under Article 3.5 lacks any
tangible effect.

a. Legal arguments against current provisions of the causal link and interpretations of
the WTO case law
The main problem undermining the effectiveness of the causality test is the ambiguity
of ADA Article 3.5, which states in a relevant part the following:
The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the
dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic
industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be
attributed to the dumped imports.
Although this article requires that injuries caused by other factors must not be
attributed to dumped imports, it does not clarify how this requirement can be fulfilled.
In practice, it becomes enough for the IA to only examine other factors of injury
without evaluating the actual effect of the other factors on the final injury
determination. If this article has been drafted to prove an accurate attribution, it must
identify the methodology for differentiating between injuries caused by dumped
imports and injuries caused by other factors. The current legal text does not require
specific methodology to differentiate between the two categories of injury, leading to
inconsistent results.

It is inadequate to find the same conclusion of causality for the following two cases:
in case A, the IA found that the determined injury of the DI is only because of the
impact of the dumped imports on the DI during the investigation period. In case B, the
IA found that the determined injury of the DI is because of the impact of the dumped
imports and the changes in the patterns of consumption in the domestic market. On
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the one hand, case A includes high certainty that the injury is attributed directly to the
dumped imports because of the absence of any other factors of injury. On the other
hand, case B lacks this assurance because the dumped imports may not have any
impact on the DI and may not cause any injury since other factors were also found.
Changes in the pattern of consumption may be the only cause of injury and that the
dumped imports may have no impact. Thus, in order to fulfill the attribution
requirement, it is not proper to attribute the injury in case B without measuring the
impact of the dumped imports and the impact of the changes of pattern of
consumption to be able to accurately conclude that injury was caused because of
dumped imports.

Despite the ambiguity of the language of ADA Article 3.5, the WTO case law
provides some clarifications, which although helpful, are still not sufficient to avoid
arbitrary injury attribution. The Appellate Body in the U.S.–Hot-Rolled Steel36
provides some clarification to the non-attribution rule under ADA Article 3.5. In this
case, Japan considered that the non-attribution rule required the U.S., in its assessment
of the other factors of injury, to identify and isolate the effect of these other factors
from the injuries caused by dumped imports in order to fulfill the requirement of the
non-attribution rule under Article 3.5. In addition, Japan believed that the U.S. must
ensure that the injury attributed to dumped imports reach the level of "material"
injury. In fact, the U.S. only considered some other known factors of injury and
concluded that the effect of these other factors were minimal and did not break the
causal link between injury and dumped imports. The Appellate Body supported the
U.S. point of view when it upheld the panel report interpretation as follows:
36
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If the injurious effects of the dumped imports are not appropriately
separated and distinguished from the injurious effects of the other
factors, the authorities will be unable to conclude that the injury they
ascribe to dumped imports is actually caused by those imports, rather
than by the other factors. Thus, in the absence of such separation and
distinction of the different injurious effects, the investigating
authorities would have no rational basis to conclude that the dumped
imports are indeed causing the injury which, under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, justifies the imposition of anti-dumping duties.37
According to this interpretation, the Appellate Body requires the IA to distinguish and
separate the injurious effect of dumped imports from other factors so as to attribute
the injury to the dumped imports. The Appellate Body asserted that the ADA does not
provide the methodology for this attribution:
We emphasize that the particular methods and approaches by which
WTO Members choose to carry out the process of separating and
distinguishing the injurious effects of dumped imports from the
injurious effects of the other known causal factors are not prescribed
by the Anti-Dumping Agreement. What the Agreement requires is
simply that the obligations in Article 3.5 be respected when a
determination of injury is made.38
Hence, the Appellate Body requires that the IA must only separate and distinguish
among injuries caused by the dumped imports and other factors. The Appellate Body
did not require that, in order to fulfill the non-attribution test, the IA must isolate the
effect of the other factors from the material injury. In fact, the Appellate Body
rejected the word "isolation" that was mentioned in a previous case regarding the
attribution test. The Appellate Body cited part of the U.S.–Atlantic Salamon AntiDumping Duties, which interpreted the non-attribution in Article 3.5 as follows:
[T]his did not mean that, in addition to examining the effects of the

imports under Articles 3:1, 3:2 and 3:3, the USITC should somehow
have identified the extent of injury caused by these other factors in
order to isolate the injury caused by these factors from the injury
caused by the imports from Norway.39
37
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The Appellate Body asserts, in commenting on U.S. – Atlantic Salamon AntiDumping Duties, that:
By following the panel in United States – Atlantic Salmon AntiDumping Duties, the Panel, in effect, took the view that the USITC
was not required to separate and distinguish the injurious effects of the
other factors from the injurious effects of dumped imports, and that the
nature and extent of the injurious effects of the other known factors
need not be identified at all. However, in our view, this is precisely
what the non-attribution language in Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement requires, in order to ensure that determinations regarding
dumped imports are not based on mere assumptions about the effects
of those imports, as distinguished from the effects of the other
factors.40
The Appellate Body in U.S.–Hot-Rolled Steel requires separating and distinguishing
between the injuries caused by dumped imports and from other factors. In addition, it
rejects the panel report interpretation of U.S.–Atlantic Salamon Anti-Dumping Duties
because the panel did not even require the IA to separate or distinguish the injuries
caused. If it is true that the Appellate Body rejected the panel interpretation because
the aim of Article 3.5 is to guarantee the non-attribution of injury caused by other
factors to the dumped imports, then it should conclude that the IA must isolate the
latter injury from the final injury assessment. However, the Appellate Body could not
conclude this because the wording of Article 3.5 does not support this approach.

Consequently, the Appellate Body’s interpretation leads to the further logical question
if the IA finds that there are many other factors of injury, should it assess the impact
of these factors individually or collectively. This is discussed in the case of EC–Pipe
Fittings where the EC found more than one other factor having an effect on its DI.
The EC assessed the impact of these factors and concluded that each one of them had
minimal impact on the DI and did not break the causal link between material injury
40
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and dumped imports. However, Brazil requested the Appellate Body to consider the
EC methodology inconsistent with ADA Article 3.5 because it did not evaluate the
collective effect of these other factors on the DI to justify the conclusion that the
remaining effects of the dumped imports were very limited. The Appellate Body
rejected this argument by Brazil on the basis that ADA Article 3.5 does not require
the EC to isolate the effect of the other factors in order to fulfill the non-attribution
test and that Article 3.5 does not require collective assessment of the effect of these
factors.41

Despite the fact that the Panel and Appellate Body made a tremendous effort to clarify
the provision of non-attribution laid down in ADA Article 3.5, this effort was
restricted by the ambiguity of the actual text of Article 3.5. It is meaningless to oblige
the IA to separate injuries caused by dumped imports and other factors without
requiring the isolation of these injuries and their causes. If the IA separates the
injuries caused by other factors, without isolating them from the overall material
injury assessment, it may attribute these injuries to the dumped imports. In the final
injury assessment, the IA will include all types of injuries, whether caused by dumped
imports or other factors, in determining the final material injury. Thus, the IA must
isolate the injuries caused by other factors from the final assessment of the material
injury in order to attribute only the injury caused by the dumped imports to the
dumped imports.
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b. Evaluation of the proposed new legal text of the ADA by the WTO members
Realizing the potential hazard of the ambiguity in the ADA Article 3.5 including the
non-attribution rule, a group of the WTO members proposed extensive amendments to
clarify the non-attribution rule and to avoid the arbitrary attribution of material injury
to the dumped imports. The Chairman of the Rules Committee provided these
proposed amendments in the Draft Consolidated Texts.42

The proposed amendments of the ADA Article 3.5 outlined two main types of
considerations. The first type of consideration is in relation to those members who
seek to incorporate into the new text amendments that reflect the interpretations
reached by the Panels and Appellate Bodies in the previous WTO cases. These types
of amendments mainly reflect interpretations discussed above in the EC–Pipe
Fittings, the U.S.–Atlantic Salmon Anti-Dumping Duties, and the U.S.–Hot-Rolled
Steel. The aim of these proposals is to oblige the IA to fulfill the non-attribution rule
by distinguishing and separating the injuries caused by the dumped imports and those
caused by other factors.43

The second type of consideration seeks to incorporate additional provisions in Article
3.5 that will attribute to the dumped imports only the material injury actually caused
by the dumped imports apart from any other injuries caused by other factors. This
type of amendment also includes scenarios where the IA must conclude that there is
no causal link between injury and dumped imports. The goal here is to reduce or
restrict the possibility of finding a causal link by showcasing additional factors which
would indicate lack of causality. For example, the IA must find no causal link
42
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between injury and dumped imports in the following situations: (1) if the volume of
non-dumped imports increased and significantly exceeded the volume of dumped
imports, (2) if there is no strong correlation between a significant price undercutting
by the dumped imports and the injury to the DI, or (3) if there is no strong correlation
between a significant increase in dumped imports and the injury to the DI. 44

These two types of considerations indicate the deficiencies in the current causality test
and confirm that the causality provisions are drafted in a way that leads to arbitrary
causal link determination. Since the current draft does not oblige the IA to isolate
injury caused by other factors from the final injury assessment, it may in the final
causal link determination attribute injuries caused by other factors to dumped imports.
Some WTO members realize the threat of maintaining weak causality provisions
since this weakness may justify the decision of imposing anti-dumping measures.
These WTO members seek to clarify and limit the causality test in order to reduce the
unjust and unjustified anti-dumping measures that may be imposed pursuant to the
ADA.

B. Reviews
1. Legal critique of the current provisions of the Sunset Review
The purpose of the Sunset Review is to allow WTO members to extend the imposition
of the anti-dumping measures for more than the maximum limit of five years. The IA
may extend the anti-dumping measures for an additional five years if it finds that
there is likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. Indeed, there
are differences between the original anti-dumping investigation and the Sunset
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Review. In the original investigation the IA must determine dumping, injury or threat
of injury, and causal link in order to impose anti-dumping measures for a maximum
of five years. In the Sunset Review the IA is not required to find dumping and injury
but rather to find the likelihood of their continuation or recurrence. The Sunset
Review does not require dumping and injury determinations because the current antidumping measures effect the DI. The effect of the current anti-dumping measures
may stop the flow of dumped imports and, completely or partially, cure the damages
of the DI. Thus, it may be impossible to determine dumping or injury after the five
year dumping measure imposition period.

Instead of requiring dumping and injury determinations, ADA Article 11.3 conditions
the examination on whether the revocation of these measures "would be likely to lead
to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury." However, Article 11.3 does not
provide any guidelines or methodological requirements for the fulfillment of the
likelihood examination. The lack of obligatory methodological requirements or at
least guidelines allows some WTO members to extend the imposition of the antidumping measures many times. In some cases, these extensions have exceeded 20
years. Protecting an industry for this length of time is completely illogical and
counterproductive. The weakness of Article 11.3 provides an easy and legal method
for overprotecting the DI, causing international market distortion by the imposition of
dumping measures against foreign products for long and continuous periods of time.
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a. Legal arguments against the current provisions of the Sunset Reviews and
interpretations of the WTO case law
The duration and review of the imposition of anti-dumping measures are provided
under the ADA Article 11. The ADA Article 11.1 sets the principle that "an
anti-dumping duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent necessary to
counteract dumping which is causing injury." This article obliges the IA not to
enforce anti-dumping measures, either in terms of their amount or time limit, without
justifying this enforcement by the existence of dumping that causes injury; however,
Article 11.3 provides a five year maximum period for that imposition. By terms of
exception, Article 11.3 provides that the IA may depart from the five year rule if it
fulfills the requirement provided in the following part of Article 11.3:
[U]nless the authorities determine, in a review initiated before that
date on their own initiative or upon a duly substantiated request made
by or on behalf of the domestic industry within a reasonable period of
time prior to that date, that the expiry of the duty would be likely to
lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. The duty
may remain in force pending the outcome of such a review. (emphasis
added and footnote omitted)
Nevertheless, the article does not provide any guidelines or methodological
framework for a WTO member to conduct Sunset Reviews. It also does not clarify the
meaning of the "likelihood of continuation or recurrence" and the circumstances
which may lead to that conclusion.

ADA Article 11.4 indicates some procedural obligations of the IA in conducting
reviews, including Sunset Review as follows:
The provisions of Article 6 regarding evidence and procedure shall
apply to any review carried out under this Article. Any such review
shall be carried out expeditiously and shall normally be concluded
within 12 months of the date of initiation of the review.
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However, the provisions of Article 6 do not clarify the methodological guidelines for
conducting a Sunset Review. Article 6 may only provide the IA conducting Sunset
Reviews with some principles, including transparency, equal opportunity, and the
right of parties to defend their interests. This vagueness may lead to arbitrary
conclusions by WTO members who wish to protect their domestic markets. Some
WTO members may impose anti-dumping measures for an extensively prolonged
period of time, relying on the absence of clear provisions in Article 11.3 describing
the legitimate method of extending the five year anti-dumping imposition period.

The ambiguity of Article 11.3 causes immense confusion for the WTO member
conducting the Sunset Reviews. Two main ways of understanding arise in the
application of this article. The first type of application, which is followed by the
U.S.45, may limit the Sunset Review to examining the development of the volume of
the imports during the imposition period of the anti-dumping measures to check if the
imports have ceased or continued. If the imports have ceased, the IA would be likely
to consider that the dumped imports may reoccur after the revocation of the antidumping measures. And if the imports have decreased but the country that is subject
to the measures increases its production capacity, or if its export to other countries has
become subject to anti-dumping measures, the continuation of dumping is likely to
occur. In this application, the injury analysis has minimal importance in the likelihood
examination because the positive economic situation of the DI would prove that the
current anti-dumping measures have succeeded in overcoming the injurious effect of
the dumped imports. This type of application mainly depends on a hypothetical injury
analysis that may include some prospective scenarios if the anti-dumping measures
45
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are revoked. In brief, the main feature of this type is that it distinguishes the
provisions of Sunset Review from the provisions of Articles 2 and 3, which deal with
the determination of dumping and injury.

The second type of application does not limit its Sunset Reviews to what has been
discussed in the first type; however, it obliges the IA to follow the provisions of ADA
Article 2 (of dumping determination) and 3 (of injury and causal link determination)
with some modifications. WTO members who follow this application realize that
Article 11.3 requires the IA to determine the current level of dumping and current
status of injury as indicated in Articles 2 and 3. Although, these members understand
the differences between the Original Investigation and the Sunset Review, they
believe that the methodology described under Articles 2 and 3 must provide a
mandatory guideline to conduct Sunset Reviews.

These two types of application were in opposition in several WTO disputes.46 Each
party in these disputes attempted to argue its interpretation to the Appellate Body
depending on advantage. In short, in these cases the Appellate Body could not provide
clear guidelines on how to conduct Sunset Reviews due to the poor drafting and
ambiguity of Article 11.3. The Appellate Body found that because of the absence of a
cross reference within Article 11 to Articles 2 and 3, the IA is not obliged to follow
the provisions of Articles 2 and 3 in conducting Sunset Reviews so as to find the
likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.
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Due to the lack of textual support, the Appellate Body found its hands tied in
interpreting the current terms of Article 11.3 to shape clearer guidelines for
conducting Sunset Reviews. Hence, the method of conducting the Sunset Review
remains unclear. The WTO members may determine their own methodology, based
on hypothetical analyses predicting what might happen in the future. In fact, the
likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury test needs restrictive
provisions to be added in Article 11.3 to set clear bases for conducting objective
Sunset Reviews. Adding these provisions will guarantee the revocation of antidumping measures after specific time limits, and will avoid unjustified extensions of
the imposition of anti-dumping measures for prolonged or unlimited periods of time.

b. Evaluation of the proposed new legal text of the ADA by the WTO members
This section highlights the proposals submitted by the WTO members to set a
methodological requirement in determining the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence of dumping and injury.

A group of WTO members proposed extensive amendments to Article 11.3 in order to
clarify the ambiguity of its provisions, which encourage some WTO members to
extend their anti-dumping measures many times on the basis of hypothetical fears of
the continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.

These proposals focus primarily on clarifying the methodological requirement in the
Sunset Review process and present two main types of considerations. The first type is
to enhance the current text in order to explicitly identify mandatory methods for the
implementation of the likelihood test. This would oblige WTO members to make
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determinations based on positive evidence involving an objective examination of all
relevant factors, and avoid arbitrary decisions that may be based on mere
presumptions.47 Two sets of examinations would determine whether the expiry of the
anti-dumping duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping.
In the first set of examinations, the IA must identify "whether there has been dumping
while the duty was in place"48, "the past and likely future performance of the
exporters"49 or foreign producers, "change in market conditions in the economy of the
member and internationally"50, "evidence of the imposition of anti-dumping or
countervailing duties by other members in respect of like or similar products" 51, and
evidence that the revocation of the duties would cause a diversion of imports into the
member country.

In the second set of examinations, the IA must identify "the likely volume of dumped
imports if the duty is allowed to expire"52, "the likely prices of the dumped imports if
the measure is allowed to expire and their effect on the prices of like product"53, "the
likely performance of the domestic industry and of the foreign industry"54, and "the
likely impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry if the measure is
allowed to expire, having regard to all relevant economic factors and indices"55 of the
DI that are mainly listed in ADA Article 3.4. 56
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The second type of consideration would avoid the possibility of maintaining or
extending anti-dumping measures for unlimited periods of time by conducting Sunset
Reviews each time before the expiration of the anti-dumping duties. Thus, this type
limits the extension of the anti-dumping measures to one time only. In addition, the
IA must not impose anti-dumping measures, under any circumstances, for more than
ten years including the imposition period of the Original Investigation and Sunset
Review. However under special circumstances, and during two years after the
termination of the anti-dumping duties, a WTO member may initiate an expeditious
action instigating immediate imposition of provisional measures if this member
receives an application containing sufficient evidence of dumping, injury, and a
causal link.57

In brief, WTO members are seeking to restrict the rules that may be used to maintain
unjustified anti-dumping measures for prolonged periods of time. They realize the risk
of keeping Article 11.3 in its current form without articulating a legitimate method of
concluding the likelihood of the continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. In
addition, limiting Sunset Reviews to be conducted for one time only and limiting the
duration of anti-dumping imposition for a maximum of ten years, may guarantee the
avoidance of unlimited extension of anti-dumping measures for same cases.
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IV. Findings and Recommendations
A. Findings
This paper provides a detailed analysis of the weaknesses of the ADA through the
provisions of ADA Articles 3.2, 3.3, 3.5 and 11.3. These articles are crucial in
justifying the imposition of anti-dumping measures and the extension of their
duration. Other anti-dumping provisions of the ADA relating to dumping
determination, such as ADA Article 2, may also be affected by the ambiguity and
uncertainty of the overall language of the text. However, this paper emphasizes the
provisions of injury determination and Sunset Reviews because they are rules used to
justify or legitimize the imposition of anti-dumping measures.

The ADA affirms that the main purpose of the WTO Agreement "is to help producers
of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business."58 To achieve
this purpose, the WTO generally strives to free the movement of goods in the
international market by reducing tariffs and eliminating non-tariff restrictions. Since
WTO members recognize the dangerous effect of dumped imports on the DI, they
drafted the ADA to allow themselves to impose anti-dumping measures under certain
conditions. It is clear that anti-dumping measures are used as a tool for evading the
main purpose of the WTO Agreement, since these measures allow members to restrict
international trade to protect their domestic markets. After thirteen years of the ADA
application, it is quite evident that the ADA is not being implemented in the way that
best serves its original purpose and the overarching goal of enhancing international
trade. Instead of using the ADA as exceptional rule to free international trade, some
WTO members use its ambiguity to abuse anti-dumping measures and impose
58
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arbitrary restrictions through legitimized inappropriate treatment. A WTO member
who commonly experiences political and economic pressures from the DI to restrict
the importation of foreign goods has no choice other than to fulfill these requirements
and impose anti-dumping measures.

The lack of clear provisions for determining injury and the lack of clear attribution
related guidelines for determining the causal link between dumping and injury, force
some WTO members to respond to the pressures of their DIs and impose arbitrary
anti-dumping measures. In addition, the lack of clear cumulating rules in the injury
assessment process allows a WTO member to impose anti-dumping measures against
imports of other members who are not actually causing injury. Another crucial
weaknesses of the ADA is that it not only encourages members to impose antidumping measures, but also to extend these measures for a prolonged and often
indefinite period of time; this is essentially due to the lack of restricting and clear
provisions and guidelines for Sunset Review processes.

It is well known to all WTO members that the ADA suffers from deficiencies. They
direct their delegations to work on modifying and clarifying the current text of the
ADA. It is also well known to all WTO members that the current text of the ADA is
used to distort the international market and the free movement of goods between
WTO members. This paper examines, in a practical manner, the reasons why the
ADA does not adequately achieve its objectives.
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B. Recommendations
Although all WTO members realize the weaknesses of the ADA, they differ, based on
their varying interests, when it comes to addressing these discrepancies or modifying
the ADA. On the one hand, the WTO members with importing interest have requested
modification of the ADA in order to guarantee unrestricted rules or rules that allow
them to apply measures without complications. They want to avoid the confusion of
Panel or Appellate Body decisions that may interpret the ambiguous rules differently
from what they understand them to be. On the other hand, WTO members with
exporting interest are struggling to limit the agreement and to complicate its
provisions to make it very difficult for a member to impose anti-dumping measures in
future investigations.

Apart from all these differences, all WTO members agree on the ADA’s linguistic
ambiguity and the dire need for modifications and clarifications. This paper endeavors
to examine and clarify the danger of this ambiguity which leads to the overuse of antidumping measures and ultimately hinders the progress and development of the
international market. However, this paper does not provide specific modifications of
the anti-dumping provisions subject to the above critique. It attempts to provide
general principles that must be followed by WTO members in their current
negotiations to amend the current legal text of the ADA if they desire to maintain an
effective and efficient application of the ADA.

The first principle is to ensure the mutual agreement on the ultimate purpose of the
ADA. Since this agreement sets out to provide an exception to the free movement of
goods in the international market, it should not undermine the main purpose of the
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WTO Agreement for the enhancement of free international trade. The second
principle is to emphasize the fact that mere dumping must not trigger the imposition
of anti-dumping measures. Finding dumped imports does not justify the anti-dumping
measures unless the WTO member ensures that these specific imports are in fact
causing or threatening to cause injury to the DI. WTO members must first find
material injury and then provide sufficient evidence attributing the determined
material injury to the specific dumped imports in question.

The third principle is that dumped imports which are imported simultaneously from
different countries must be evaluated separately. Each country must not be penalized
on the same level if it is evident that their imports do not have the same effect on the
DI. The forth principle is that anti-dumping measures provide the DI with temporary
protection in order to recover from the existing material injury and these measures
must not be applied indefinitely. However, the WTO member may initiate new
investigations against the same dumped imports, based not only on assumptions or
likely examinations, but on the basis of actually testing and observing the effect of the
revocation of original anti-dumping measures. The designated period for testing this
effect can be set for a limited period of time after the revocation. Finally, there must
be a common understanding between the WTO members that using anti-dumping
measures as a method protecting against imported foreign goods does not always
benefit the domestic market, but may damage the function of fair competition and
may negatively affect the interest of the domestic consumers. Anti-dumping measures
may also negatively affect the domestic producers who are producing goods that
depend on intermediate imported goods. Since the cost of importing these goods will

55

be increased after the imposition of anti-dumping measures; consequently, this will
increase the cost of their finished goods.

If the WTO members acknowledge these general principles they understand that
overuse of anti-dumping measures will harm their DI and consumers as well as the
progress of the free international market. Renegotiating the ADA is crucial in order to
return the anti-dumping provisions to their main purpose, that of opposing dumped
imports causing or threatening to cause material injury. Indeed, all WTO members
have experienced the negative effect of the overuse of anti-dumping measures that
distort the international market by restricting the free movement of 19 different
sectors in the harmonized tariff system. Thus, corrections must include balanced and
clear new language fulfilling the purposes of the WTO ADA and be respected by all
WTO members.
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